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II

SOCIAL CULTURE IN THE FORM OF EDUCATION AND RELIGION ¹

I

According to the ingenious and suggestive scheme of classification of Arts and Science adopted by the Director and Administrative Board of this International Congress, Social Regulation forms the sixth division and Social Culture the seventh division of the entire program. Social Regulation is made to include as sub-topics, politics, jurisprudence, and social science, while Social Culture includes education and religion. Politics and jurisprudence have to do with the State, while social science is conceived as including for its objects the civil community in its industrial, municipal, and family groups, and in its providential and protective aspects.

Social Culture, on the other hand, is the common name or title for the two branches of theory and practice that deal with the self-development of the individual under the direction of the church and the school.

This is our division,—the seventh and last in the entire scheme of classification,—and it is the topic of this hour's discussion to consider the unity of Education and Religion.

II

I shall announce as my thesis, that: Social Culture is the training of the individual for social institutions.

Man by his social institutions secures the adjustment of the individual to the social whole—the social unit. The person, or individual, comes into such harmony and co-operation with human society as a whole that he may receive a share of all the production of his fellow-men; be protected against violence

¹ Paper read before the International Congress of Arts and Science, Division G (Social Culture), at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis, Mo., September 19-24, 1904.

by their united strength; given the privilege of accumulating property and of enjoying it in peace and security, in such a manner as to escape from sudden approaches of famine and penury by reason of seasonal extremes or by reason of the vicissitudes of infancy, old age, disease, or of the perturbations affecting the community. And finally, there is participation in the wisdom of the race—the opportunity of sharing in the knowledge that comes from the scientific inventory of nature in all its kingdoms, and of human life on the globe in all its varied experiments, successful and unsuccessful; the opportunity of gaining an insight into the higher results of science in the field of discovery of laws and principles—the permanent forms of existence under the variable conditions of time and place. Finally, we may share thru our membership in the social unity in the moral insights that have resulted from the discipline of pain—the defeats and discomfitures arising from the choice of mistaken careers on the part of individuals and entire communities. The sin and error of men have vicariously helped the race by great object lessons which have taught mankind thru all the ages, and now teach the present generation of men,—all the more effectively because of the devices of our civilization which not only make the records of the past accessible to each and every individual, but institute a present means of intercommunication by and thru which each people—each individual—may see from day to day the unfolding of the drama of human history.

The good of this unity of the individual with the social whole by means of institutions may be summed up by saying that it re-enforces the individual by the labor of all, the thought of all, and the good fortune of all. It takes from him only his trifling contribution from his trade or vocation and gives in return a share in the gigantic aggregate of productions of all mankind. It receives from him the experience of his little life and gives him in return the experience of the race, a myriad of myriads strong, and working thru millenniums.

What Thomas Hobbes said of the blessings of the political whole, the State, is true when applied to civilization as an international combination of States:

"Outside of the State," said he, "is found only the dominion of the passions, war, fear, poverty, filth, isolation, barbarism, ignorance, and savagery; while in the State is found the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, ornament, sociability, elegance, science, and good will."

With this point of view we see at a glance the potency of the arts of social culture, fitting as they do the individual for a co-operative life with his fellow-men in the institutions of civilization.

III

My thesis proceeds from this insight to lay down the doctrine that the first social culture is religion and that religion is the foundation of social life in so far as that social life belongs to the history of civilization. Religion in the first place is not merely the process of an individual mind, but it is a great social process of intellect and will and heart. Its ideas are not the unaided thoughts of individual scholars, but the aggregate results of a social activity of intellect, so to speak; each thought of the individual being modified by the thought of his community so that it comes to the individual with the substantial impress of authority.

There is a religious social process, the most serious of all social activity. In it the religious view of the world is shaped and delivered to the individual by authority such as cannot be resisted by him except with martyrdom. Each modification in the body of religious doctrine has come thru individual innovation, but at the expense of disaster to his life. He had to sacrifice his life so far as his ordinary prosperity was concerned, and his doctrine had to be taken up by his fellow-men acting as social whole, and translated into their mode of viewing divine revelation before it effected a modification in the popular faith. It was a process of social assimilation of the product of the individual comparable to the physiologic process by which the organs of the body take up a portion of food and convert it into a blood-corpuscle, before adding it to the bodily structure.

So in the living church of a people goes on forever the great

process of receiving new views from its members, and its members include not only the Saint Bernards, but also the Voltaires. The Church receives the new views, but does not by any means adopt them until it has submitted them to the negative process of criticism and elimination, and finally to the transforming process that selects the available portions for assimilation and nutriment. This is certainly the slowest and most conservative spiritual process that goes on in civilization. But it is by all means the most salutary. The individuals that suggest the most radical modifications are swiftly set aside, and their result is scarcely visible in the body of faith transmitted to the next generation.

It is clear this conservatism is necessary. Any new modification of doctrine gets adopted only by the readjustment of individuals within the communion or church. All the inertia of the institution is against it. Again, it is not only necessary but desirable, because it is a purification process, the transmutation of what is individual and tainted with idiosyncrasy, into what is universal and well adapted for all members within the communion. The Church must prove all things and hold fast to that which can stand the test. The test is furnished by what is old, by what is already firmly fixed in the body of religious faith. If its foundations could be uprooted so that religion gave up the body of its faith, all authority would go at once to the ground, and with it the relation of the institutional whole to the individuals within it. Such an event can scarcely be conceived in a realizing sense, but a study of the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution aids one to gain a point of view. When a citizen finds himself in a social whole in which all the principles that have governed the community have become shaky, he gets to be unable to count on any particular set of social reactions in his neighbors from day to day, or to calculate what motives they may entertain in their minds in the presence of any practical situation. He is forced into an attitude of universal suspicion of the intentions of his fellow-men, and he is in his turn a general object of suspicion himself. The solution forced on the community is the adoption, by the Committee of Safety, of death for all sus-

pected ones. But the more deaths the more suspicion. For the relatives of the slain—those who yesterday were with us, but who endeavored to dissuade us from guillotining their parents, brothers, or cousins—as to those we are warranted in suspecting that they to-day are planning a new revolution and to-morrow may put us to death.

We may by this, after a sort, realize the situation when the foundations of religious belief are utterly broken up.

Fortunately for us our civilization carries with it even under varying creeds, sects, and denominations, the great body of religious belief unquestioned. Only the Nihilists offer a radical denial to this body of Christian doctrine, and we can see how easily we might come to a Reign of Terror if it were possible to spread this Nihilistic doctrine widely among any considerable class of our people. For the Nihilistic view would extend its death-remedy after the destruction of its enemies, to its own ranks, and guillotine its own Robespierres by reason of suspicion and distrust entertained toward one's accomplices.

The substantiality of the view of religion is the basis of civilization. It holds conservatively to elementary notions of an affirmative character such as the monogamic marriage, the protection of helpless infancy in certain fundamental rights, the protection of women; the care for the aged and the weaklings of society; private ownership of property, including under property land and franchises as well as movable chattels. The Church includes in its fundamentals the security of life against violence, and makes murder the most heinous of crimes. It insists on respect for established law and for the magistrates themselves. It even goes so far as to protect the heretic and to insure the private right of the individual to dissent from the established or prevalent religious creeds so far as Church worship or dogmas of theology are concerned. It is obvious that the community as social whole would be obliged to limit its toleration of private creeds were there a great extension of Nihilism possible or were there to arise sects that attacked the sacredness of the family institution—by polygamy, for example, or by the abolition of marriage; or sects that attacked civil

society by attempting practically to abolish the ownership of property (Proudhon said "All property is robbery"); or by the denial of the right of laborers to contract with employers for their labor.

When we study these fundamental ideas common to the different confessions of our composite church, we see at once how powerful is the established doctrine of the prevailing religious ideal in our civilization in exerting an authoritative control over individuals as to belief and practice.

IV

Many people have come to believe in this age of greatly extended religious toleration, that the Church as an institution is moribund, and that its authority is about to disappear wholly from the earth in an age of science, of the ballot box, and of universal secular education at public expense. It would seem to them that public opinion is sufficient or about to become sufficient by means of the newspaper and the book to secure life, personal liberty, and the peaceful pursuit of happiness without the necessity for a religious provision for social culture. Only the culture that comes from the secular school is adjudged to be necessary for all.

For the proper consideration of this question it is necessary to take up more fundamentally the origin and real function of religion. We shall find two fundamental views of nature and man the foundation of two opposite religious movements in the world history—the Christian and the Oriental. According to one of these views our free secular life, our science and the arts, our literature and our productive industry and our commerce, are utterly perverse and not to be tolerated on any terms.

A year ago or more there was published a letter written by an Arab Sheik of Bagdad to the editor of a Paris newspaper (*La Revue* for March, 1902), in which he expressed admiration for certain external characteristics of European civilization, but found no words bitter enough for his detestation of the Christian religion professed by all European nations. To him it was all a horrible blasphemy. The pure One as

preached in the Koran is sovereign and transcendent, and to speak of it as Divine-human, or as triune in the Christian sense, is to the Mohammedan an act of unspeakable sacrilege. Therefore if our triumphs in science and art flow from our religion the worshiper of Islam must regard them as his mortal foe.² And yet the Arab Sheik is much nearer to the Christian view than is the Buddhist or the Brahmin. The East Indian view holds a first principle that repudiates or shuts out from its attributes consciousness and will and feeling—all the elements of personality. But the Allah of the Koran is personal and in an important sense ethical, having the attributes of righteousness and goodness borrowed from the Old Testament by the Hanyf preachers of the Ebionitic sect of Old Testament Christians who proselyted Mohammed, as shown by Sprenger.³ But Brahma is above the ethical distinctions

² *Le Dernier mot de l'Islam à l'Europe*. Par le Sheikh Abdul Hagk de Bagdad; Paris, *La Revue* No. 5 (1st March, 1902). Passage translated from the beginning:

"Christian Peoples: The hatred of Islam against Europe is implacable. After ages of effort to effect a reconciliation between us, the only result to-day is that we detest you more than ever. This civilization of yours and its marvels of progress which have rendered you so rich and so powerful, be it known to you that we hate them and we spurn them with our very souls . . . the Mohammedan religion is to-day in open hostility against your world of progress. . . We explain how it is that we spurn with horror not only your religious doctrines but all your science, all your arts, and everything that comes from Christian Europe . . . I the humble Sheik Abdul Hagk, member of the holy Panislamistic league, come with a special mission to explain clearly how this comes to be. . . Our creed is this: There is in the universe one sole being, God, source of all power, of all light, of all truth, of all justice, and of all goodness; He has not been generated; He has not generated anyone. He is single, infinite, eternal; Alone, He wished to be known; He made the universe, He created man. He surrounded man with the splendors of creation and imposed on him the sacred duty of worshipping Him alone. To worship continually this only God is man's only mission on earth. Man's soul is immortal; his life on earth only a probation . . . the supreme duty of man to worship the only God and to sacrifice himself to Him without reserve; the sum of all iniquity to renounce the only God and to worship a false God . . . for us Musulmans there is a world containing only two kinds of human beings, believers and infidels (mécréants); love, charity, brotherhood to the believers; contempt, disgust, hatred, and war for the infidels. Among the infidels the most hated and the most criminal are those who worship God but ascribe to Him earthly parents, or fatherhood, or a human mother. Such monstrous blindness seems to us to surpass all measure of iniquity: the presence among us of infidels of this kind is the plague of our life; their doctrine is a direct menace to the purity of our faith; contact with them is defilement, and any relation with them whatever a torment to our souls."

³ *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed*; Berlin, 1869. Chapter I, p. 16-27, 37-47, 60, 69, 70-77, 101-107.

of good and evil, and goodness and righteousness are as naught to him and to the Yogi who seeks by mortification to get rid of his selfhood.

Let us endeavor to find, by the well-known road taken by the philosophy of history, the twofold root of all human experience which gives rise to the religious insights which in their first form of external authority govern human life before the advent of the stage of reflection and individual free thought—religion before secular education.

V

Examine life and human experience as we may, we find our attention drawn to two aspects or opposite poles, so to speak, of each object presented to us.

The first aspect includes all that is directly perceivable by the five senses, sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch. This is the aspect of immediate existence.

But experience begins at once to go beyond the immediate aspect and to find that it is a product or effect of outlying causes. We are not satisfied with it as an immediate existence, it now comes to be for us an effect or mediated existence.

If we call the first aspect an effect, we shall call this second aspect a causal process.

Each immediate object, whether it be thing or event, is an effect, and beyond it we seek the causes that explain it. The first pole of existence is therefore immediate existence, and the second is the causal chain in which the object, whether it be considered as thing or as event, is found.

Since the causal process contains the explanation of immediate existence, the knowledge which is of most importance is that knowledge which includes the completest chain of causation. It is the knowledge of primal cause which contains the fullness of explanation. And the mind of the human race has devoted itself chiefly to the question of first cause.

In this search, as already suggested, it has been the mind of the social whole of a people that has done the thinking rather than the minds of mere individuals. Even the most enlight-

ened individuals and the most original and capable ones have borrowed the main body of their ideas from the religious tradition of their people, and their success in effecting modifications and new features in the existing creed has been due to the co-operation of like-minded contemporaries which assisted the utterance of the new idea so far as to make it prevail. Again the collisions of peoples settled by war and conquest have brought about new syntheses of religious doctrine which have resulted in deeper religious insight and more consistent views of the divine nature.

It has been the long-continued process of pondering on the second aspect of things and events, the second pole of experience, that has reached the religious dogmas of the greater and greatest religions of human history—a process of social units in which whole peoples have merged.

This process has been a study of the question how the perfect One can be conceived as making a world of imperfect beings. For imperfect or derivative beings demand another order of being, an originating source, as a logical condition of existence. But this source must explain not only the efficient cause of the imperfect but also the motive or purpose, the final cause or end of the creation of the imperfect being.

There are two great steps which religion takes after it leaves ancestor-worship and other forms of animism, in which disembodied individuals as good or evil demons reign as personal causes in an order above the natural order of things and events which are immediately present to our senses.

As the intellect of man became developed, socially and individually, the great step was taken above all secondary causes to a first cause transcending nature and also transcending time and space, the logical conditions of finitude and multiplicity.

The transcendent unity, in which all things and events lost their individual being and mingled in one chaotic confusion, is conceived as a great void into which all things and events are resolved when traced to their first principle.

Transcendence was in the first stage of religious con-

templation the important attribute to be kept in mind when thinking of the First Cause.

To halt in this thought of mere transcendence of the world meant pantheism in the sense that the One is conceived to possess all being and to be devoid of finitude. It exists apart in an order above all finitude, as found in our experience. To deny all relation to finitude comes as a result from this abstract thought of the infinite. It is the nothing of the world of experience and is to be thought of as its dissolution. The philosophy of Kapila in the Sankhya Karika, the religion of both the Yoga doctrines, the Yoga of complete ascetism (of Patanjali) as well as the Karma Yoga expounded in the Bhagavad Gita, reach a One not only above things and events and above a world-order but also elevated even above creatorship—and above intellect and will—a pure being that is as empty as it is pure, having no distinctions within itself nor for others—light and darkness, the widest distinction in nature, are all the same to Brahma and so also are good and evil, sin and virtue, “shame and fame,” as Emerson names these ethical distinctions in his poem of Brahma,—they are all one to Brahma.

VI THEISM

When the social mind had reached this insight of the transcendence of the Great First Cause we see that it lost the world of things and events and had annulled one of the two poles of experience which it was attempting to explain. And it had left in its thought only a great negative abstraction, pure being or pure naught, with no positive distinctions, not even consciousness, nor the moral idea of ethics, goodness and righteousness or mercy and justice. It was obliged to deny the creation altogether and conceive the world as a vast dream, a maya.

Asia's chief thought is this idea of transcendence of the One First Cause, above the world and above creation and creative activity. But in the Old Testament we have the last word of Asia; it reveals an insight which reacts against the thought of this abstract oneness as transcendental Being and sets in its place the idea of a creator.

God as creator makes the world, but does not lose his sovereignty by this act. He also retains consciousness, inward distinction; he is personal, having intellect and will and also feeling.

The pantheistic idea which conceived God only as transcendent One, followed its thought out to the denial of all creative activity and even to the denial of all inward distinction of subject and object. It ended its search for a first cause (following out the causal line which it began with) by denying causality altogether and finding only a quiet, empty being devoid of finitude within itself and annihilating objective finitude altogether. Hence its search ended with the denial of true being to the world and to man.

But this self-contradiction was corrected by the Israelitic people who felt an inward necessity—a logical necessity—of conceiving the First Cause as active, both as intellect making internal distinctions of subject and object, and also as a free will creating a world of finite reality in which it could reveal itself as goodness. The essence of goodness, in the Old Testament sense of the idea, consists in imparting true being to that which has it not,—God creates real beings. Goodness not only makes others but gives them rights; that is to say, gives them claims on its consideration.

While Orientalism with the single idea of transcendence or sovereignty arrived at the idea of a One without the many, and at a consequent destruction of what it set out to explain, Theism found a First Cause that could explain the world as created by an ethical being, a personal One that possessed what we call “character,” namely a fixed self-determination of will—of which the two elements were goodness and righteousness. This doctrine conceived ethics as a fundamental element in the character of the Absolute, a primordial form of being belonging to the First Cause.

Time and space according to the first form of religion—that is to say, according to the first completed thought arrived at by the social intelligence of the race—are illusions and the producer of illusions. All illusions arise in the primordial distinction of subject and object which constitutes the

lapse into consciousness out of primeval unity which is not subject and object.⁴ This thought of Kapila becomes the basis of the religion of Buddhism, the religion founded on the simple idea of transcendence of the One First Cause above all causality. This is opposite to the religion of the Bible, which reveals the divine as a One that is goodness. Goodness is so gracious as to create and give independent reality to nature and man—in short, to make man able to sin and to defy the First Cause his Creator. Here emerges for the first time the idea of sin. Man, as maya or illusion, is not created nor is he a creator of things or events—his deeds are only seeming, for he does not possess true reality himself. But with the doctrine of theism man has an eternal selfhood given him and is responsible for the acts of his will; he can sin and repent.

He can choose the ethical and form in himself the image of God, or on the other hand he can resist the divine and create an Inferno.

While theism commands man to renounce selfishness, pantheism commands to renounce selfhood.

Theism contains in it as a special prerogative the possibility of meeting difficulties insoluble to pantheism. It has solved the great difficulty of conceiving a first cause so transcendent that it is no cause of the world and man. For theism sees the necessity of goodness and righteousness in the first cause and hence finds the world and man in the divine mind. But it, too, sees divine sovereignty and does not lose that thought in its theory of man and nature. Nature is full of beings that perish, notwithstanding the fact that they come from a perfect Creator. The history of man is full of sin and rebellion against goodness and righteousness. But our theistic insight knows that God is holy; that he possesses perfect goodness and righteousness. The exclusive contemplation of the imperfections of man and even of his best works leads to the pantheistic denial of the world and to despair as to man's salvation before the sovereign first cause. The religion of theism often lapses towards Orientalism in its condemnation

⁴ Memorial verses of the Sankhya Karika, Nos. XXI, XXII, XXIV, LXII, LXIV.

of nature and history as empty of all good. Whenever it has gone so far that it blasphemes the First Cause by limiting divine goodness, the Church has given a check to this tendency and ushered in an epoch of missionary effort, wherein the true believer leaves off his excessive practice of self-mortification and devotes himself like St. Francis to the work of carrying salvation to the lost. It goes out like St. Dominic to save the intellect and to have not only pious hearts but pious intellects that devote their lives to the study of the creation, trying to see how God works in his goodness, giving true being to his creatures, and lifting them up into rational souls able to see the vision of God.⁵

VII

The piety of the intellect contains in it also another possibility of lapse into impiety of intellect, namely thru lack of power to hold to the sovereignty of God. It may go astray from the search of the first cause and set up secondary causes in place of a first cause. This is the opposite danger to pantheism, which gets so much intoxicated with the divine unity that it neglects nature and history and discourages intellectual piety and loses the insight into the revelation of God's goodness and righteousness in the creation of the world.

There are two kinds of intellectual impiety, one kind that goes astray after a secondary cause in place of a First Cause and the other that passes by secondary causes as something unworthy of the True First Cause; not seeing that the true First Cause makes the world with three orders of being: the lower ministering to the higher and the higher to the lower: an inorganic below an organic realm; and within the organic realm creating the animal below the man, and among the races of man making savages below civilized peoples. It does not see that in all these divine goodness has its own great purpose—to make the world of time and space an infinite cradle for the development of spiritual individuality. The Christian God is not an abstract One delighting only in abstract ones,

⁵ See Goethe's *Faust*, "Scene in Heaven" (Part II, Act V, scene 7), Pater Profundus and Pater Seraphicus.

but a Creator delighting in creators—commanding true believers to engage in the eternal work of the First Cause, namely by multiplying his creative and educative work.

Thus from one or another form of impiety of the intellect there arise collisions with the Church from age to age.

A closer and closer definition of the dogma arises out of the struggle.

One of the greatest epochs of struggle in the church arose in the time of the importation of Arabian pantheism into Spain, and thence into the other parts of Europe by reason of resort of Christian youth to the medical schools established by the Arabs.

The great commentators on Aristotle, Avicenna and Averrhoes came to notice and caused great anxiety by their interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the active Reason (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), which they held to exist only in God; and upon the death of the individual, the passive soul of reason (*νοῦς παθητικός*), which is conceived by them as a temporary manifestation of the active Reason, withdrew and was absorbed into the deity, losing its individual being.

To Christianity the doctrine of individual immortality is vital. Without it the world-view of the Church would suffer dissolution.

The publication of the pantheistic version of Aristotle forced Christian scholars to study seriously the Greek philosophy. Piety of the heart and piety of the will did not suffice. Piety of the intellect was needed, and it came in a series of thinkers who wrote the expositions of Christian theology of which the *Summa theologiæ* of Thomas Aquinas is the great exemplar. Piety of the intellect overcame the dangers of religious heresy.

After an epoch of rapid philosophical development—a period of a too exclusive devotion to the piety of the intellect—there came a decadence in the piety of the will and the piety of the heart, and when this began to have its visible effects in the neglect of the secular interests of the Church a reaction set in, which culminated in the triumph of the pestilent doctrine of nominalism thru the dialectic skill of William of Occam, and as a

consequence the great philosophy of Saint Thomas of Aquino fell into neglect. But this gave an opportunity for the triumph of the study of secondary causes. Natural science began new inventories of nature and new studies of mind which set forth theories almost mechanical in their results.

With nominalism no speculative investigations into the nature of a first cause are permissible. All that is left is an empirical study of things and events—an inventory and a classification; theories of forces; mechanical composition and decomposition of bodies; the transformation of sensations into ideas. Ideas were regarded as of the nature of mere opinions and of less truth than the sensations which furnished the only vivid certainty esteemed to be of real worth.

There is bound to arise a reaction against religious authority whenever the Church itself neglects the exposition of the intellectual insights which are the most vital part of its contribution to civilization. For if the Christian world-view is rendered untenable, the piety of the will and the piety of the heart will soon decay.

A series of skeptical reactions not only against the Church but against the authority of the State have taken place, as a result of this movement away from theology and towards an exclusive study of secondary causes.

The German word *Aufklärung*, or clearing-up of the mind, has become more or less familiar to us as including the phases of this revolt against authority.

It holds to the study of secondary causes and the neglect of the First Cause.

VIII

There has been only one great *Aufklärung*, the French Revolution which swept together all the negative tendencies into one movement of destruction to Church and State. But there are numerous, very numerous minor movements. In every department its influence is felt.

In the last half of the nineteenth century Herbert Spencer occupied, and still occupies, much attention. It is interesting to note that in his generalizations of science he adopted the

agnostic view of his system from Hamilton and Mansell. Back of that view is Hume's skepticism especially with regard to the category of causality, and it would not be difficult to trace his extreme nominalism to the stream of influence that William of Occam set flowing within the Church.

Herbert Spencer's theory of the world resembles in a marked manner the doctrine of the Oriental mind that the world process finally comes to nothing. One after another, things and events appear and then vanish again and all remains as at first.⁶ It is a Sisypheus movement with no permanent outcome and no worthy result. It begins with the homogeneous, undifferentiated condition of matter and moves towards heterogeneity, individuality, and complexity of function. Evolution is this process of individualization. But all evolution is to be followed by dissolution, a return to the chaotic and unindividualized state of the homogeneous which Spencer considered to be unstable and, so to speak, impelled to evolution, but which in the end becomes unstable again and seeks its equilibrium in chaos.

⁶ "Evolution," says Spencer, in that concise statement of his system found in his *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 650-652, "Evolution . . . is a movement (6) not simply from homogeneity to heterogeneity, but from an indefinite homogeneity to a definite heterogeneity; and this trait of increasing definiteness, which accompanies the trait of increasing heterogeneity, is, like it, exhibited in the totality of things and in all its divisions and subdivisions down to the minutest. (7) Along with this redistribution of the matter composing an evolving aggregate, there goes on a redistribution of the retained motion of its components in relation to one another; this also becomes, step by step, more definitely heterogeneous. (13) Dissolution is the counter-change which sooner or later every evolved aggregate undergoes. Remaining exposed to surrounding forces that are unequibrated, each aggregate is ever liable to be dissipated by the increase, gradual or sudden, of its contained motion; and its dissipation, quickly undergone by bodies lately animate, and slowly undergone by inanimate masses, remains to be undergone at an indefinitely remote period by each planetary and stellar mass, which since an indefinitely distant period in the past has been slowly evolving, the cycle of its transformations being thus completed. (14) This rhythm of evolution and dissolution, completing itself during short periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates distributed thru space completing itself in periods which are immeasurable by human thought, is, so far as we can see, universal and eternal—each alternating phase of the process predominating, now in this region of space and now in that, as local conditions determine. (16) That which persists, unchanging in quantity but ever changing in form, under these sensible appearances which the Universe presents to us, transcends human knowledge and conception—is an unknown and unknowable Power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time."

One of the chief leaders of the *Aufklärung* has thus returned to Orientalism, and his infinite and eternal is only an unknown and unknowable power—he calls it “unknown and unknowable,” tho he let us clearly see that there is a shuttle motion produced by it out of chaos into individuality and from individuality back again into chaos.

A creative goodness which lifts into being an infinity of other selves of animals and men, only to swallow them up again by a jealous reaction, drawing them down into the homogeneous ocean of chaotic matter, deserves rather to be called, as Plato in the *Timæus*, and Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* called it, envy and jealousy (*φθόρος*), a quality of mind which they thought not possible to find in the idea of God as Creator.

The only effective counter-movement against the *Aufklärung* is the return to a study of the First Cause.

This does not mean the neglect of secondary causes, but their proper adjustment. It is an application of the great results of religious thought—a social institutional kind of thinking that should be gone over by every individual for his enlightenment. The Church should elaborate its application of the thought of the First Cause to all secondary causes, showing in each case how the divine goodness connects and explains the entire movement from the mechanical to the chemical and from these to the crystal, the plant, the animal, and to man.

I review, in concluding my paper, the line of argument based on the second or causal aspect of experience:

1. The first religious step is taken when all secondary causes are aggregated into one group and included in the world-order in what we have called the first pole of experience. Ancestor-worship with its infinite series of finite spirits belongs only to a world order. A true originating causality, a first cause, belongs to a second and higher order, to a self-determining or originating order of being which transcends the world of things and events; all things and events depending upon a being derived from beyond, and not in themselves possessing self-existence; and the true second order possessing independence, self-existence, and the power to produce duality

by consciousness, will, or some other form of self-determination.

2. The first thinking of this transcendent being becomes absorbed in the contemplation of its transcendence or sovereignty over the first order. While the first order is dependent and must derive its support, all that it has, from a higher order of being; the second order is independent and can exist by itself. The religious contemplation is absorbed in this fact of independence or transcendence; it searches the origin of the dependent order in the sovereignty of the independent order; but it does not find at first, in the independent, the motive for the dependent. It halts in the thought of transcendence and denies reality to the world of things and events; it becomes pantheism or Orientalism; it denies creatorship in the first principle.

3. The result of the first insight into the presupposition of dependent being has reached an independent being which is devoid of true causality and which does not impart its true being to a derived world; this is pantheism. But, again, this result contradicts the presupposition on which the insight into the second order is based. For unless there is presupposed a true originating causality, a self-determining One, the higher order of being exists only in itself and not for itself; its causality is not real to itself; if its causality produces only a world of phenomenality and illusion, then the result of its causality is only to reveal to the independent being its own inefficiency as a cause; it is a cause which cannot produce anything real, hence it is not a true cause.

4. The history of the religions of Asia is a history of the discovery of the self-contradictions of pantheism—of a true causal being which does not truly cause. It is also a series of attempted solutions to introduce true causality without destroying the transcendence or sovereignty of the First Cause. For to introduce any finite motive, that is to say, any motive depending upon another underived being, would destroy the perfection of the first original cause and reduce it to a secondary cause and thus throw back the entire investigation to the stage of ancestor-worship. The escape from this dilemma which

offers a choice between the destruction of the imperfect world and the destruction of the perfect world, or its renunciation by philosophic thought, is found in the doctrine of the Logos and its complete exposition in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

5. True causality is the self-revelation of the highest order of being. But it does not in its pure self-determination reach secondary causes. Its action in itself is the revelation of a perfect in a perfect; this is the doctrine of the Logos. Perfect self-determination results in perfect revelation in another, an eternal object becomes an eternal subject whose thinking and willing are one and hence goodness and righteousness. Thru this thought it is explained how the primary causality in the Logos becomes secondary causality thru the contemplation of goodness and righteousness as the inner essence of causality.

6. The Christian view of the world, therefore, does not compromise its idea of the transcendency or sovereignty of the First Cause, but preserves it perfectly and at the same time introduces transcendency into the world-order by the doctrine of the immortality, freedom, and responsibility of the human soul who thru religious insight interprets the entire world-order as a process of creation and salvation; the process of creating souls with independent individuality and infinite powers of self-development in will and intellect, in goodness and righteousness. Consciousness proceeds thru science and philosophy and theology everlastingly towards a completer comprehension of the divine method of creation of real being, that is to say, of moral beings thru the inorganic and the organic processes in time and space and thru the discipline of moral beings by means of their historic experience of life. This development of consciousness makes possible the co-operation of the human will with the divine will. This is the ultimate cause presupposed by secondary causation. It is the second aspect of experience.

7. This view of the world elevates it into the highest significance, not thru its secondary causes, but thru its first cause as the divine self-activity in its goodness and righteousness. It is infinite grace.

8. This view of the world makes secondary causes significant in the light of the First Cause. It makes the history of nature thus interpreted a part of the book of divine revelation.

9. With the pantheistic interpretation, the divine purpose disappears from the realm of secondary causes, and with this there vanishes all true causality and high significance to science. For the objects of science, namely, material nature and human history, when separated from the divine and devoid of a share in the causal activity of a transcendent being who is a real cause, become a chaos of illusion, the East Indian Maya.

10. In the ruder forms of religion, the varieties of ancestor-worship and fetichism, science has no place, because all secondary causes become capricious activities of spiritual beings not subordinated to a first principle of goodness and righteousness.

11. It follows from these considerations that social culture in the form of the Church and the School as independent institutions becomes possible only on the basis of the religious world-view of Christianity; and that the perennial continuance of the world-view of Christianity thru the special form of social culture which belongs to the Church is a necessary condition presupposed by the forms of social culture intrusted to the School.

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